Archive for December, 2014


December 31, 2014

FoxNews on December 31, 2014, reported that a South Korean freedom fighter said that he will launch balloons carrying DVDs of Sony’s “The Interview” toward North Korea to try to break down a personality cult built around dictator Kim Jong Un. Excerpts below:

Park Sang-hak said he will start dropping 100,000 DVDs and USBs with the movie by balloon in North Korea as early as late January. Park, a North Korean defector, said he’s partnering with the U.S.-based non-profit Human Rights Foundation, which is financing the making of the DVDs and USB memory sticks of the movie with Korean subtitles.

Park said foundation officials plan to visit South Korea around Jan. 20 to hand over the DVDs and USBs, and that he and the officials will then try to float the first batch of the balloons if weather conditions allow.

“North Korea’s absolute leadership will crumble if the idolization of leader Kim breaks down,” Park said by telephone.

In October, North Korea opened fire at giant balloons carrying anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets floated across the border by South Korean anti-communists, trigging an exchange of gunfire with South Korean troops.

North Korea has long demanded that South Korea stop the activists, but Seoul refuses, citing freedom of speech.

Park said the ballooning will be done clandestinely, with the pace picking up in March 2015 when he expects the wind direction to become more favorable.

The Human Rights Foundation says on its website that it works with North Korean defectors to use hydrogen balloons to send material across the border, as well as smuggling items through China and broadcasting radio transmissions to reach those who own illegal short wave radios.


December 27, 2014

Heritage Foundation on December 16, 2014, (Issue Brief # 4320) noted that while the West has primarily been focused on Russia’s recent actions in eastern Europe, Moscow has continued with its plans to militarize the Arctic. Russia’s strategic goals in the Arctic are to secure current and potential energy resources located in the region and to maintain military superiority above the Arctic Circle… Excerpts below:

The Arctic region is quickly becoming strategically important. The possibility of decreased ice coverage during the summer months and advances in technology mean that shipping, natural resource exploration, and tourism will increase economic activity.

Although the current security challenges of the Arctic are not yet military in nature, military capability in the region can be used to support civilian authorities. Both civilian search and rescue (SAR) and natural disaster response in such an unforgiving environment as the Arctic can be augmented by the military. However, Russia has taken steps to militarize the Arctic for what can be only for non-civilian purposes.

Some of Russia’s recent actions in the Arctic include:

Russia’s Northern Fleet, which makes up for two-thirds of the Russian Navy, has been based in the region.

A new Arctic command was established in December 2014 to coordinate all Russian military activities in the Arctic region.

Russia is increasing the number of marines assigned to the Northern Fleet by one-third. The force will eventually be equal to the size of another brigade and will be located near Pechenga, Russia—less than 10 miles from the border to Norway.

Two new so-called Arctic brigades will be permanently based in the Arctic region over the next few years.

Soviet-era military facilities in the Arctic region are being reopened after nearly 30 years.

The role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Arctic is the source of ongoing debate for the alliance. Although NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept was praised for acknowledging new security challenges for the alliance, such as cyber and energy security, Arctic security was not included. In fact, the word “Arctic” cannot be found in either the 2010 Strategic Concept or the 2014 Wales NATO summit declaration.

Libya campaign, the primary force driver for its armed forces is still Arctic security. The Norwegians have invested extensively in Arctic defense capabilities. Norwegian officials, both military and civilian, want to see NATO playing a larger role in the Arctic.

The Norwegian position regarding NATO’s role in the Arctic is in contrast to Canada’s. Like Norway, Canada has invested heavily in its Arctic defense and security capabilities. Unlike Norway, the Canadians have made it clear that they do not want NATO involved in the Arctic. Generally speaking, there is concern inside Canada that non-Arctic NATO countries favor an alliance role in the Arctic because it would afford them influence in an area where they otherwise would have none.

As a security alliance, NATO is committed to defending the territorial integrity of all its members, including any territory in the Arctic. This is why the alliance must work hard to overcome its internal differences on NATO’s role in the Arctic region.

The U.S.’s security concerns in the Arctic are derived from the fact that it is an Arctic power and through its membership in NATO. As Russia continues to develop military capabilities in the region the U.S. must:

Work with allies to develop a NATO Arctic strategy. It is time for NATO to develop a comprehensive Arctic policy to address security challenges in the region. This should be done in cooperation with non-NATO members Finland and Sweden.

Work with NATO’s non-Arctic members, such as the U.K. and the Baltic states, to promote an agenda. The U.K. takes an active interest in the Arctic. Geographically, the U.K. is the world’s closest country to the Arctic Circle without actually being an Arctic country. The Baltic states work closely with the Nordic countries, which are Arctic powers. The U.S. should leverage its relationships with these countries to advance an Arctic agenda inside NATO.

Continue participating in training exercises in the region. Exercises above the Arctic Circle, such as Cold Response 2014, are vital to ensuring that the alliance is prepared to meet potential threats to Arctic security. The U.S. should also consider hosting NATO exercises in Alaska.

Ensure that the U.S. maintains robust capabilities in the region. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has the primary responsibility for the Arctic waters of the U.S. Currently, the USCG is not properly funded to carry out the tasks that are required to keep America’s Arctic region secure and to enforce U.S. sovereignty in the region.

As Russia continues to develop and increase it military capabilities in the Arctic region, the U.S. and its allies must closely monitor these activities. In the Arctic, sovereignty equals security and stability.

Respecting the national sovereignty of others in the Arctic while maintaining the ability to enforce one’s own sovereignty will ensure that the chances of armed conflict in the region remain low.

Luke Coffey, who authored the brief, is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation.


December 26, 2014

FoxNews on December 26, 2014, published an AP story on South Korea, the U.S. and Japan planning to sign their first-ever trilateral intelligence-sharing pact next week to better cope with North Korea’s increasing nuclear and missile threats, Seoul officials said. Excerpts below:

The U.S. has separate, bilateral intelligence-sharing agreements with South Korea and Japan, both American allies which are hosts to tens of thousands of American troops.

But Seoul and Japan don’t have such bilateral pacts amid long-running history disputes stemming from Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. In 2012, the two almost forged their first-ever intelligence-sharing pact but its signing was scrapped at the last minute due to backlash in South Korea.

Under the trilateral pact, South Korea and Japan would share intelligence, only on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, via the U.S., according to a statement from Seoul’s Defense Ministry.

The pact would enable the three countries to swiftly respond to any North Korean provocation at a time when its threats are growing following its third nuclear test in February 2013, the statement said.

South Korean officials have said the North is believed to have made progress in its goal of manufacturing nuclear warheads small and light enough to be placed on a missile capable of reaching the U.S., given that eight years have passed since its first bomb tests.

The formal signing of the pact by the South Korean vice defense minister and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts will take place on December 29, according to South Korean defense officials.


December 22, 2014

Aftonbladet (Stockholm) rapporterade den 12 december 2014 om ett finskt par som bodde i en ordinär Tyresö-villa utanför Stockholm fram till början av 1990-talet i själva verket var KGB-agenter. Utdrag nedan:

Så här står det i arkivet om KGB-paret med agentnamnen Filon och Filonka, i översättning från ryskan. Av hänsyn till levande släktingar — som inte vill uttala sig — har vi tagit bort deras riktiga namn:

”Filon” – född 1916 i Helsingfors, finsk medborgare, radiotekniker. Värvad 1955, skickad till Sverige 1956 för att skapa en dubbelriktad radiopunkt med kontakt med centrum. Hans hustru värvades 1960. I juli 1961 köpte Filon ett hus i Stockholms-området för KGB:s pengar, där han utrustade byggnaden som en radiovåning.

Sommaren 1962 skickades han till Sovjetunionen, där han genomgick en operativ-teknisk tilläggsförberedelse.

1963 fick han en krigsradiostation och ordnade en reguljär dubbelriktad radioförbindelse. 1972 insjuknade hans dotter i xxx och Filon lades ner som radioman. Hans adress användes för genomgående postförsändelser. Huset kostade vid köptillfället 65 000 kronor eller 11 147 rubler. För att skapa trovärdighet för agenten, beslöts att man skulle låna pengar i banken. Totalt betalade KGB ut 98 732 kronor. Stämpelavgift, utgifter för husets underhåll, försäkringskostnad, reparation och hälften av uppvärmning och belysning gick på KGB:s räkning. Filon uteslöts från agentnätet på grund av ålder och sjukdom, huset fick han behålla för gratis användning. 1976.”

I en annan notering står:

”Filon och Filonka värvades 1955 /…/ Filons månadsbetalning: 650 kronor.”

Filon och Filonka gifte sig 1938 och hade två barn. De flyttade till Sverige, för att upprätta radiokontakt med KGB-högkvarteret Lubjanka i Moskva.

En radioförbindelse där Filon både kunde ta emot och sända meddelanden.

Att han fick en ”krigsradiostation” antyder att hans uppgift var att bli sambandscentral i en krigssituation, bland annat för KGB-agenter som redan var på plats i Sverige.

Radiosamband kunde också användas för att ge stöd vid olika operationer på svensk mark. Gick något snett kunde övriga medverkande snabbt meddelas.

Aftonbladet har i Mitrochins KGB-arkiv hittat en beskrivning av hur Moskva i december 1962 gav KGB-residenturen i Oslo i uppdrag att köpa och installera en agent i en radiolägenhet, alltså nästan samtidigt som Filon och Filonka skickades till Sverige.

Där står bland annat att en portabel radioutrustning måste kunna döljas i ett torrt gömställe i lägenheten eller huset, att det måste finnas ett fönster som har fri sikt i riktning mot ”Centret” (det vill säga KGB i Moskva) och att man ska kunna föra ut en yttre antenn genom fönstret.

Filons och Filonkas Tyresö-adress användes också för ”postförsändelser”. KGB hade ett omfattande agentnät i Västeuropa.

För att minska risken för upptäckt skickade de inte brev direkt till varandra och till KGB:s högkvarter, utan via värvade privatpersoner som ofta bara hade till uppgift att ta emot brev och sedan lämna över försändelserna vid snabba möten på stan.

Filon blev 76 år. Han bodde kvar i Tyresö-huset till sin död 1993, medan hustrun Filonka — som blev 85 år — bodde där till sin död 2001.

I dag är huset rivet och en toppmodern villa står sedan några år tillbaka på tomten.

Förutom de radiosambandslägenheter som KGB upprättade runtom i Västvärlden, så ägnade sig Sovjetunionens underrättelsetjänst också åt en omfattande signalspaning. Den utfördes ofta vid landets ambassader runtom i världen.

Enligt Mitrochins KGB-arkiv lyckades till exempel 15 KGB-residenturer på norra halvklotet fånga upp 62 000 krypterade radiomeddelanden från 60 länder under 1971.


December 20, 2014

Aftonbladet rapporterade den 11 december 2014 att i över 30 år fanns uppgifterna om en svensk högskolebibliotekarie i Vasilij Mitrochins KGB-arkiv vid Churchill Archives Centre i brittiska Cambridge. Utdrag nedan:

”Lab”- XX, född xxxx i X, svensk. KGB-agent. Bearbetning 1976-77. Medarbetare vid X i X (som bibliotekarie). ”Lab” gick med på att mot pengar leverera teknisk-vetenskaplig dokumentation, däribland FOA:s arbeten (Sveriges försvarsdepartement). 1981 vägrade ”Lab” att medverka, han var rädd för upptäckt. Under tiden för ”Labs” arbete för KGB-avdelningen utbetalades mer än 250 000 svenska kronor till honom för material.”

Lab berättar nu om händelserna i slutet av 1970-talet.

Han uppger att han vid ett tiotal tillfällen under tre, fyra års tid kopierade internationella tidskriftsartiklar med tekniskt-vetenskapligt innehåll som hans kontakt Vladimir Medovnikov begärt att få och som han överlämnade vid möten på olika restauranger.

Regelbundet och med några månaders mellanrum bjöds Lab på lunch och fick 500 kronor i ett kuvert.

– Jag fick 500 kronor för ingenting. Så låt dem hålla på med det då, tänkte jag, så får vi se hur länge det går, säger Lab.

Varför sålde du dokumenten?

– Ja, alltså varför sålde jag dem? Vad spelade det för roll?

Du visste ju att han var från Sovjetunionen?

– Jo, men vad spelar det för roll. Vad var det för någonting med Sovjetunionen?

På 1970-talet hade KGB sju inhämtningsområden i varje land – eller ”linjer” som det kallades. Ett av dem var industrispionage:

– Industrilinjen ”X”, inhämtar material beträffande vetenskap och teknik inom ämnesområden där man själv är underlägsen, skriver den numera avlidne Säpo-medarbetaren Tore Forsberg i en bok från 2003.

Lab beskriver hur allt förändrades när hans första kontakt, Medovnikov, reste hem till Sovjetunionen:

I slutet av 1990-talet knackade plötsligt två Säpo-män på hemma hos Lab.

De hade då — precis som andra västliga underrättelsetjänster — fått tillgång till Mitrochins KGB-arkiv (vilket de inte berättade för Lab) och hittat hans namn:

– Det var Säpo som berättade för mig att Medovnikov var KGB-man, påstår Lab.

De båda Säpo-männen träffade Lab sammanlagt tio timmar vid tre tillfällen.


December 18, 2014

NewsMax on December 17, 2014, reported that Cubans in Miami’s Little Havana reacted with anger and dismay to President Barack Obama’s dramatic bid to end a half-century Cold War with the communist-ruled island. Excerpts below:

“It is a betrayal. The talks are only going to benefit Cuba,” said Carlos Munoz Fontanil in Calle Ocho, the heart of an exile community that has long pined for the fall of the Castro regime in Havana.

He spoke as dozens of people gathered outside Cafe Versailles, a Little Havana landmark, to protest the rapprochement announced almost simultaneously in Washington and Havana by Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro.

“I knew this was going to happen,” said a frustrated Osvaldo Hernandez, of the anti-Castro organization Vigilia Mambisa, clearly unhappy with the developments as he joined protesters carrying a sign denouncing Washington’s “betrayal.”

Hernandez, 50, said he suspected Obama had been planning the opening for a long time, but pinned his hopes on a Republican-controlled Congress.

“The trade embargo will never be lifted,” he said.

An equally outraged Felix Tirse, who arrived from Cuba 53 years ago, said Obama’s announcement showed “a lack of respect.”

“He is more communist than others,” he said.

Tomas Regalado, the Cuban-born mayor of Miami, arrived on Calle Ocho to commiserate with his fellow countrymen.

“It’s sad that the U.S. has given everything in exchange for nothing,” he said, referring to Cuba as “still a terrorist nation.”

“You would hope that request for democracy or free elections or to free Cuban political prisoners would have been part of the deal,” he said.


December 17, 2014

Expressen (Stockholm) rapporterade den 4 november 2014 att i den topphemliga operationen AntiRYAN planerade den sovjetiske generalsekreteraren Leonid Brezjnev och KGB-chefen Andropov på 1980-talet att mörda den svenska stats- och militärledningen.

Ett 50-tal kärnvapenrobotar och atomminor skulle samtidigt sättas in mot Sverige.

De sensationella uppgifterna framförs i den nya boken “Omöjlig ubåt”, skriven av kommendören av första graden, Nils-Ove Jansson. Utdrag nedan:

Under åren 1992-95 var Nils-Ove Jansson chef för överbefälhavarens topphemliga Underrättelse- och säkerhetskontor och ställföreträdande chef för den militära underrättelse- och sökerhetstjänsten.

Ett kapitel ägnas åt den mindre kända sovjetiska underrättelseoperationen AntiRYAN på 1980-talet.

Operationen syftade till att upptäcka om USA och dess allierade planerade att sätta in ett överraskande kärnvapenanfall mot Sovjetunionen. Endast generalsekreteraren, KGB-chefen och ett fåtal politbyråmedlemmar och underrättelseofficerare var fullt insatta i operationen, skriver Nils-Ove Jansson.

I Sverige visste försvarsledningen ingenting.

Men den ryska planen gick ut på att om säkra underrättelser pekade mot ett kärnvapenanfall från väst – så skulle detta förekommas med ett eget, motsvarande anfall.

“Svenska stridskrafter och central ledningsförmåga skulle slås ut genom en kombination av olika åtgärder som fysisk bekämpning av baser, eliminering av ledande personal inom regeringen och försvarsmakten samt utslagning av elförsörjning och telekommunikationer.”

Det konstateras också att en viktig komponent i operationen var “de marina spetsnazförbanden som hade till uppgift att infiltrera svenskt territorium redan före krigsutbrottet och föra med sig kärnvapenladdningar”.

Enligt Nils-Ove Jansson innebar planen att de marina spetsnazförbanden skulle framgrupperas till Stockholmsområdet, de svenska marinbaserna – och kärnkraftverken. Där skulle de vara beredda att på order placera ut kärnladdningar på förutbestämda platser.

Vid den högsta beredskapsnivån skulle atomminorna osäkras.

Och allt gick enligt plan – med ett undantag: U 137.

Den ryska ubåten grundstötte i samband med en operation som gick ut på att evakuera en spetsnazgrupp som haft till uppgift att förbereda atomsprängning av den marina Blekingebasen, hävdar Nils-Ove Jansson.

Sammantaget skulle minst ett 50-tal kärnvapenrobotar och atomminor sättas in mot Sverige.

Men på senare tid har Rysslands agerande, under president Vladimir Putin, flera likheter med situationen på 1980- och 90-talet, enligt Nils-Ove Jansson.


December 15, 2014

Aftonbladet rapporterade den 11 december 2014 att en svensk socialdemokrat i maktens närhet värvades av Sovjetunionens underrättelsetjänst KGB 1973.

Det framgår av Vasilij Mitrochins KGB-arkiv…Utdrag nedan:.

På plats i Churchill Archives Centre i brittiska Cambridge har Aftonbladet grävt fram handlingar med svensk koppling i Vasilij Mitrochins nyligen offentliggjorda KGB-arkiv.

I dag kan vi avslöja att två KGB-kontakter i svenska regeringskansliet finns presenterade med kodnamn – dock inte med deras identiteter – i arkivet.

Så här står det i ordagrann översättning från ryskan:

”Slim” – Medarbetare i svenska regeringskansliet, aktiv socialdemokrat. Värvad 1973. Arbetade sex år utomlands, återvände till Sverige 1978, där Akulovij återupprättade kontakt med honom.

”Bertil” – Medarbetare i svenska regeringskansliet, värvad 1962 i Finland. Samband upprättat mellan honom och KGB i Moskva.

Handlingarna i Mitrochins KGB-arkiv visar också att KGB 1957 planerade att skicka en agent till Stockholm som skulle söka kontakt med medarbetare vid statsministerns kansli, diplomater, aristokrater och affärsmän. Det skulle ske genom besök på restaurangerna Den gyldene freden och La Rond.

Dessutom skulle agenten, som hade en falsk österrikisk identitet, försöka bli medlem i herrklubben Sällskapet och besöka sporthallen Squash.

Hela planen gick snöpligt om intet när svenska Säpo satte stopp för agentens inresa, troligen eftersom han redan stod under övervakning av engelsk och amerikansk underrättelsetjänst.

Förre chefen för Säpos kontraspionage Olof Frånstedt säger:

– Alla som var på svenska ambassaden i Moskva blev hårt bearbetade för att samarbeta.

Hur reagerar du på att en kusin till en KGB-agent fick i uppdrag att förföra en svensk diplomat?

– Det är inte oväntat. Honungsfåglar krånglade sig över bostadsfönster och approcherade icke ont anande svenska medborgare på ambassaden. Alla ambassadörer och tjänstemän på hög nivå var utsatta för mycket hård bevakning.


December 14, 2014

Washington Free Beacon on November 25, 2014, reported that Russia, China, Iran, and Islamists are waging unconventional warfare around the world, and the United States currently lacks a clear strategy to counter the threat, according to a recent report by the Army Special Operations Command. Excerpts below:

“This challenge is hybrid warfare combining conventional, irregular, and asymmetric means, to include the persistent manipulation of political and ideological conflict,” states the Army white paper, “Countering Unconventional Warfare.”

“Foreshadowed by Iranian actions throughout the Middle East, and by Chinese ‘unrestricted warfare’ strategists in the 1990s, hybrid warfare has now reached its most brazen form in Russia’s support for separatist insurgents in Ukraine.”

The 48-page white paper, published Sept. 26 by the Fort Bragg, North Carolina command, urges building new, non-kinetic warfare tools into a comprehensive U.S. and allied strategy.

The tools should include covert and clandestine special operations commando activities combined with political, intelligence, diplomatic, and financial warfare methods to counter the activities of states like Russia, China and Iran, and insurgent activities by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State.

Countering unconventional warfare also should be made “central to U.S./NATO security policy and practice over the next several decades,” the report states.

The Army study said the U.S. government “lacks a cohesive [information warfare] strategy to counter adversary [unconventional warfare] campaigns conducted by state and non-state actors, and this has hindered the U.S./NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine.”

“The U.S. government must develop a comprehensive framework to plan and execute regional and global IW strategies and operations that counter adversary UW campaigns as part of a whole-of-government approach,” the report said.

Russian unconventional threat

The report says that while Islamists in Iraq and Syria are “cascadingly disruptive,” the threat posed by Russia is more significant.

“Russian unconventional warfare is thus the central, most game-changing component of a hybrid warfare effort involving conventional forces, economic intimidation of regional countries, influence operations, force-posturing all along NATO borders, and diplomatic intervention,” the report said.

“The brazen audacity of unconventional warfare within Russian hybrid warfare has produced urgent concern among America’s NATO and non-NATO partners that Russia may apply similar approaches to other regional countries in the region with dissenting Russophile populations, such as the Baltic States, Moldova, and Georgia,” the report adds.

According to the report, Russia is using special operations forces, intelligence agents, political provocateurs, and news media reporters, as well as transnational criminal elements in eastern and southern Ukraine.

“Funded by the Kremlin and operating with differing degrees of deniability or even acknowledgement, the Russian government uses ‘little green men’ for classic [unconventional warfare] objectives,” the report says.

The objectives of Russian covert warfare include “causing chaos and disrupting civil order” and provoking an excessive reaction from Ukrainian security organs that Moscow hopes will delegitimize the Kiev government.

The Russians have engaged in a successful unconventional warfare campaign against Ukraine by organizing pro-Russian separatists and dispatching advisers and fighters from Russian special forces and intelligence units to assist them. Activities include funding and arming, tactical coordination, and fire support for separatist military operations.

Col. David S. Maxwell told a U.S. Special Operations Command briefing in July 2014 that counter unconventional warfare, or U-CW in Army parlance, can prevent states and groups from achieving their strategic aims.

Counter programs against unconventional war are likely to be “protracted and psychological-centric in nature,” Maxwell told SOCOM and added that the United States should “comprehensively employ political, economic, military, and psychological pressure” to degrade both the will and capability of enemies to use the new form of warfare.

U.S. should resume political warfare

The report quotes the late George Kennan, architect of Cold War containment policies against the Soviet Union, as urging the use of “political warfare,” which he defined as peacetime efforts using all means short of conflict to achieve national objectives.

The future geopolitical environment will feature ideological battles among states, the report said, noting that “Russia, China, and Iran currently conduct political warfare activities to further their individual goals.”

The United States, by contrast, ceased using political warfare at the end of the Cold War and instead is focused on “public diplomacy” that seeks to “tell America’s story” rather than influencing events in support of U.S. and allied interests.

The United States should renew political warfare efforts as part of a new strategy to influence local struggles, the report said. Additionally, “policies should be developed assigning political warfare as a core mission of government agencies responsible for C-UW doctrines and capabilities,” the report said.

Among the tools are increased intelligence to understand foreign unconventional threats and applying diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, and legal power along with military forces to wage hybrid and irregular counter-war.

Key elements of a new strategy will be using special operations “special strike” capabilities, like the use of Seal Team Six, and “surgical strike capabilities” a reference to precision attacks, such as covert drone strikes that have been highly effective against terrorist leaders.

Ken McGraw, a spokesman for the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., said the Army report is a doctrinal think piece. Countering unconventional warfare currently is “neither a recognized special operations mission or activity in either Army or joint special operations doctrine” but could be in the future, McGraw said.

China’s ‘Unrestricted Warfare’

China’s use of unconventional warfare was described in the Army report as based on the 1999 book by two Chinese colonels called Unrestricted Warfare that calls for using all means to defeat enemies, including cyber attacks, ecological warfare, financial warfare, and terrorism.

“China will use a host of methods, many of which lie out of the realm of conventional warfare,” the report said. “These methods include trade warfare, financial warfare, ecological warfare, psychological warfare, smuggling warfare, media warfare, drug warfare, network warfare, technological warfare, fabrication warfare, resources warfare, economic aid warfare, cultural warfare, and international law warfare.”

Examples include China’s threat several years ago to sell off large U.S. debt holdings to protest U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and cutting off sales of rare earth minerals to Japan in a dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

Chinese news outlets also are used in media warfare, including at the White House. “The Chinese state-controlled television station network CCTV has a White House pool reporter that could influence U.S. media reporting on China issues,” the report said.

Cyber attacks also are a key Chinese unconventional warfare tool and the report said Chinese hackers are suspected of causing power outages in the northeastern United States and Florida, the report said.

“China’s cyber-attacks clearly show the vulnerabilities to the U.S. public and private sectors information and infrastructure security,” the report said. “States like Russia and China will continue to exploit weaknesses in cyberspace to gather information and influence others.”

Iran’s Qods Force

Iran’s main use of unconventional warfare is its support for terrorism and subversion through surrogates, like the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force.

“Through the Qods force, Iran provides ‘material support to terrorist or militant groups such as HAMAS, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, and Iraqi Shia groups,’ the report said.

“Hezbollah is the primary terrorists’ proxy for Iran working together with a campaign of terror against Israel, the United States, and other western nations.”

Qods operatives are working in Iraq with Shia militias to “counter U.S. objectives and diminish the presence and influence of Sunni groups,” the report said.

Iranian special operations commandos in Iraq are trained to attack critical infrastructure such as dams, power plant, and pipelines.

Iran also is developing cyber warfare capabilities as one of its key unconventional warfare tools.

“Iran seeks a sophisticated offensive cyber capability to weaken adversaries to gain military superiority and to counter external actions and activities,” the report said

“An effective cyber capability allows Iran the ability to have effects on an adversary with plausible deniability, and those cyber actions may not reach the level of retaliatory reactions.”

Iranian hackers were blamed in 2012 by U.S. intelligence for cyber attacks on U.S. banks that produced “debilitating” effects, the report said, adding that Iranian hackers also infiltrated Navy and Marine Corps computer networks.

Iran also is backing the Syrian Electronic Army cyber group.

“Adversaries are using and growing capabilities, which avoid current western overmatching combat strengths,” the report concludes. “Adversaries will continue using asymmetrical approaches such as applications derived from technological proliferation, cyber operations, terrorist activities, information, and media operations to diminish western advantages.”

Like conventional military strategy, the report says a counter unconventional warfare approach should rely on intelligence about enemy activities that can be used in counter attacks against enemies.

Additionally, U.S. special operations forces can apply similar methods used in unconventional warfare as part of their operations, the report says.

Irregular warfare main form of conflict

Sebastian Gorka, the Horner professor of military theory at the Marine Corps University and an adviser to Army Special Operations Command, notes that 80 percent of all war since Napoleon has been irregular or unconventional. “So only a fool would believe that ‘Big War’—tanks versus tanks, fighter jets versus fighter jets—will define the threat to America,” he said.

The biggest challenge for the U.S. policymakers in Washington is to treat U.S. Special Forces and irregular warfare as tactical assets and a tactical domain. They also fail to understand that the Green Berets are a strategic asset, and that China, Iran, Russia, and the jihadis are all at war with us right now,” Gorka said.

Bill Cowan, a former Army Special operations officer, said the need for a strategy to counter unconventional warfare is obvious but the recommended “whole of government approach” is a problem.

“No matter how well thought out and put forward, any implementation of a strategy that requires ‘a whole government’ approach to implement becomes problematic from the outset,” Cowan said.

“The notion of ‘coordinated synergy’ undermines the very basis of implementation unless driven decisively from the highest levels of the U.S. government,” he said. “We don’t have the leadership to make this concept/doctrine the core doctrine of our fight against our enemies.”


December 13, 2014

Washington Times on December 12, 2014, reported that House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, Michigan Republican, said that the U.S. under President Obama is not doing enough to combat terrorism around the world and that the threat posed by extremist Islamic militants today is as great as it has been at any time since before 9/11. Excerpts below:

“The threat matrix, I have never seen as bad as it is today,” said Rep. Mike Rogers, the Michigan Republican, who is preparing to leave Congress and the post he’s held since 2010.

At a breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor in Washington, Mr. Rogers said that the rise of the Islamic State can in large part be blamed on an isolationist approach pushed by the Obama administration, as well as by a small wing of the Republican party, over the past several years.

“I’ve been on this committee for a decade,” he said. “I’ve never seen it quite so bad because you have more streams of individuals who are associated with radical Islam, who are saying that they have either an aspiration or a capability to do attacks in the West, meaning in Europe, in the United States.”

He said that the Obama administration has “made conscious decisions to disengage,” and that the situation unfolding in the Middle East today is hauntingly comparable to the years prior to 9/11.

“We are in the process of letting it fester and the longer it goes, the more likely it is they’ll have a successful attack in the United States or Europe,”Mr. Rogers said.

Asked whether the U.S. is winning the global war on terrorism, the congressman responded: “We’re not configured today to win this fight.”

Much of the world now perceives the Islamic State and other extremist groups to be “winning” and taking advantage of American disengagement, he added.

He pointed particularly to the future threat posed by thousands of foreign fighters holding either U.S. or Western European passports, who have flocked to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State.