Newsweek on April 3, 2015, published the key findings of a team of prominent Americans and Ukrainians on aiding Ukraine with arms. Excerpts below:
The Kremlin has been waging a covert, hybrid war against Ukraine since February 2014. In this war, Moscow has used a combination of local separatist forces, irregular volunteers and Russian special forces and regular (conventional) forces. Since the original Minsk I cease-fire in September and the Minsk II cease-fire in February, the Kremlin-directed forces have taken additional territory.
A team consisting of General Wesley K. Clark (Ret.), former supreme allied commander, Europe; Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes (Ret.), former director, defense intelligence agency; and Lieutenant General John S. Caldwell (Ret.), former Army research, development and acquisition chief, met with senior civilian and military officials, including Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt, and Ukrainian ministers, parliamentarians and leaders at all levels of the military, both in Kiev and in the operational area. Excerpts below:
The form of warfare currently undertaken by aggressor forces in Ukraine is a hybrid-heavy form of warfare—a new model not seen before. Despite political and media commentary to the contrary, the fighting in Ukraine is not a civil war driven by Ukrainian separatists. It is a war directed, financed and supplied by the Kremlin that also exploits the discontent of some of the population of the Donbass.The idea that Ukraine is helpless against Russian aggression is wrong and should be refuted, but, on balance, Ukraine’s capabilities are woefully inadequate.
The Ukrainian government has adequately marshaled the resources it has, but Ukrainian forces are arrayed against a much stronger aggressor. Ukrainians are mobilizing under conscription. Some 41,000 troops have been mobilized thus far. New forces are being rudimentarily trained and sent into the operational area for further training during this cease-fire.
Ukrainians do well against the separatists and irregulars but cannot withstand direct engagement with Russian regular forces, who are heavily involved in the fighting in Ukraine’s east.
According to estimates, some 9,000 Russian Federation personnel and 30,000 to 35,000 separatist fighters are in eastern Ukraine. These forces include some 400 tanks and 700 pieces of artillery, including rocket launchers. Another approximately 50,000 Russian military personnel are located along or near Russia’s border with Ukraine. A further 50,000 Russian personnel are located in Crimea.
Russian forces use very advanced weapons systems—tanks, artillery and mortars, air defense systems, helicopters, secure communications, electronic countermeasures, communications intelligence, imagery systems, satellite-borne systems and other tactical and operational capabilities.
Ukraine is using old “Soviet-era” equipment combined with limited numbers of modern equipment and capabilities. Ukrainian forces have a huge military equipment shortage:
• Radio. They cannot communicate by radio due to Russian jamming, which is also effective at degrading, disabling and even misdirecting GPS. The use of very strong electronic counter-measures, such as destructive jamming, was also noted…
• Anti-armor weapons. Ukrainians have no such weapons, except a close-range tank main gun that is ineffective against the Russian T90 tanks.
• Effective night vision sights. Ukrainian tanks have virtually no effective night vision sights. Russian tanks have French or modern Russian FLIR sights.
• Counterbattery radars. The old Ukrainian sound-ranging passive counterbattery sets are ineffective.
• Counter-sniper. The Ukrainian forces need several hundred modern sniper rifles with day and night optics to run an effective program to counter Russian snipers.
By itself, Ukraine will not be able to stop the aggression. Ukraine needs immediate military assistance in seven critical areas:
1. Strategic imagery and other electronic/communications intelligence detailed and timely enough to be able to provide warning of an impending attack;
2. Long-range, mobile anti-armor systems, as well as the shorter ranger Javelin system, both equipped with thermal imagery;
3. Secure tactical communications down to vehicle level;
4. Long-range, modern counter battery radars able to detect firing positions for long-range rockets;
5. Sniper rifles with thermal or night vision sights for counter-sniper teams;
6. Modern intelligence collection and electronic warfare systems effective against Russian digital communications; and
7. whatever counter UAV systems can be made available on a near-term basis. The urgency here is driven by the pending Russian spring offensive. At the minimum, a palletized, emergency assistance package consisting of as much of the lethal components as possible should be assembled and pre-deployed for strategic airlift upon commencement of the Russian offensive.
Wesley Clark was the supreme allied commander, Europe, of NATO from 1997 to 2000. This report first appeared on the Atlantic Council website.